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I. Introduction
On September 4, 1998, members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee asked Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
Louis Freeh to research the legality of assassinating terrorist
leaders.1 Specifically, the Senators wanted a clarification as to
whether the prohibition on assassinations of heads of state
embodied in Executive Order 12,3332 also applies to terrorist
groups.3 This request followed the August 7, 1998 bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania.4
The alleged mastermind behind these bombings, which killed
224 people, including twelve Americans, is Osama bin Laden.5
Bin Laden is a fundamentalist Muslim multimillionaire6 who was
exiled from his homeland, Saudi Arabia, because of his terrorist
activities Although between twenty and twenty-five terrorist
groups are currently active in the United States, Freeh identified
bin Laden's group, al Qaeda, or "the Base," as "particularly
dangerous because of its great resources and multinational
I See Senators Ask Legality of Assassinating Suspected Terrorists, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4, 1998, at 13A [hereinafter Senators Ask Legality], available in
1998 WL 103099878.
2 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1981).
3 See Senators Ask Legality, supra note 1.
' See Larry Neumeister, U.S. Indicts bin Laden in Bombings, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1998, at IA, available in 1998 WL 13115604.
5 See id.
6 See Senators Ask Legality, supra note 1. Osama bin Laden's wealth comes from
his inheritance of a construction fortune. See Mark Matthews, U.S. Grand Jury Indicts
bin Laden; Top Islamist Terrorist Charged in Absentia in Embassy Bombings,
BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 5, 1998, at 1A, available in 1998 WL 4991669.
7 See Bernard E. Trainor, Intelligence is the Best Weapon Against Terrorism,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1998, at A19, available in 1998 WL 9150292.
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following."'
The United States has made attempts to lessen bin Laden's
threat. The U.S. military responded to the embassy bombings with
bombings of bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan.9 More
recently, a U.S. federal grand jury indicted bin Laden, charging
him with the embassy bombings.'0 In addition to using FBI agents
to track him, the U.S. government is offering a $5 million reward
for the capture of bin Laden in order to encourage his extradition."
Despite these efforts, FBI officials concede that it is unlikely that
bin Laden will be brought to justice: "There's no doubt he has the
8 Freeh Says Threat of Terrorist Retaliation Is Stronger Than Ever, COM. APPEAL,
Sept. 4, 1998, at A5, available in 1998 WL 13975508; see also bin Laden Financing
Muslim Militants in Bangladesh, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 20, 1999, at 23A,
available in 1999 WL 4101604 (discussing bin Laden's alleged attempts to finance an
extremist Islamic group in Bangladesh). In fact, bin Laden has maintained connections
in the United States at least since the 1980s when he opened an office in Brooklyn, New
York to aid refugees from the war in Afghanistan. See Neumeister, supra note 4, at IA;
see also Steve McGonigle, Arlington Man, bin Laden Linked for Years, Files
Show: Muslim Cleric Denies Involvement with Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 17, 1999, at IA, available in 1999 WL 4100860 (discussing the discovery of a
connection between bin Laden's terrorist activities and an Arlington, Texas Muslim
cleric).
9 See Paul Richter, White House Justifies Option of Lethal Force Policy: Despite
Assassination Terrorists Are Targeted, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at Al, available in
1998 WL 18888235.
" See Matthews, supra note 6, at IA. The grand jury indictment was issued on
November 4, 1998. See id. Muhammad Atef, bin Laden's military commander, was
also indicted. See id. Bin Laden denies any involvement in the bombings, although he
says he is not sorry about what happened. See Bin Laden Reportedly Denies Role in
Bombing of U.S. Embassies in Africa, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 1998, at A2, available
in 1998 WL 22241183.
In addition to the embassy bombings, the indictment charges bin Laden with
leading terrorist groups in 20 countries. See Matthews, supra note 6, at IA. It also
charges that bin Laden and his followers attempted to kill U.S. military personnel
located in Somalia and Saudi Arabia. See id. Further, the indictment alleges that they
tried to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons. See id. The indictment cites bin Laden's
and al Qaeda's opposition to U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War and in Somalia
as the motive for terrorist acts. See id. The terrorists viewed these actions as a U.S.
attempt to occupy Islamic countries. See id.
Bin Laden was previously indicted for conspiring to kill Americans in June
1998 in a secret U.S. grand jury proceeding. See id.
I See Neumeister, supra note 4, at IA.
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resources to stay hidden."'2 In light of bin Laden's February 1998
command for Muslims "to kill Americans anywhere in the world
they can be found[,]' 3 the United States must consider other
options to ensure the elimination of bin Laden as a threat to its
citizenry. As a U.S. Justice Department official noted, Americans
are not the only ones who suffer from a terrorist attack: "In a
greater sense, all of the citizens of the world are also victims
whenever and wherever the cruel and cowardly acts of
international terrorism strikes .... And it is up to the authorities
of the world [such as the United States] to respond vigorously and
unrelentingly to such terrorist attacks."' 4
Part II of this Comment examines the legality of assassination
of a terrorist leader in light of U.S. national law and Executive
Order 12,333."5 In Part III the Comment discusses the
international implications of assassinations of terrorist leaders
under the United Nations Charter and customary international
law. 6 Part IV explores other alternatives in preventing terrorism. 7
Finally, Part V concludes that the assassination of bin Laden is a
viable option for the U.S. government because it not only
eliminates the immediate threat of bin Laden but also provides a
clear deterrent for other persons or groups considering attacks on
Americans."
II. National Law and Executive Order 12,333
Ostensibly, U.S. national policy prohibits assassinations. The
ban on assassinations, in the context of war, dates to the Hague
Regulations of 1907, which prohibit the treacherous killings of
adversaries during war.'9 This standard was included in the 1956
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
'5 See infra notes 19-70 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 71-147 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 148-83 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 184-206 and accompanying text.
19 See Francis A. Boyle, Remarks, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. 287, 296 (1987).
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10 on the Law of Land Warfare. °
The manual notes that since political assassination is a war crime,
any person, military or civilian, who commits such an act is
subject to punishment. Further, the "act of state" defense is not
applicable; thus, government officials are also subject to penalties
22for committing an assassination. This policy, however, mandates
standards for behavior during war. Since the United States is not
officially at war with bin Laden or his group, these guidelines do
not govern this particular situation.
The relevance or irrelevance of Executive Order 12,333,
banning assassinations,23 is not as clear, hence the request by the
Senate Judiciary Committee to research the implications of an
order on the assassination of bin Laden.24 The Executive Order,
issued by President Reagan in 198 1,25 provides: "No person
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination. 26
Furthermore, "[n]o agency of the Intelligence Community shall
participate in or request any person to undertake activities
forbidden by this Order.,
27
Reagan's mandate was based on a 1976 Executive Order, also
prohibiting government officials and agents from engaging in
assassinations, issued by President Ford.28  Ford adopted this
20 See id.; Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126
MIL. L. REv. 89, 120 (1989). This rule "does not, however, preclude attacks on
individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied
territory, or elsewhere." Id. For example, the United States intentionally attacked a
Japanese military plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto on April 18, 1943. See id. at 121.
21 See Boyle, supra note 19, at 296.
22 See id. at 297. The "act of state" defense allows government officials to avoid
individual liability for actions taken in their official capacities as representatives of
states. See id. In the context of war crimes, regardless of title or position, a person is
personally responsible for such acts, even if ordered pursuant to state policy. See id.
23 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 213 (1981).
24 See Senators Ask Legality, supra note 1, at 13A.
25 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 116.
26 3 C.F.R. 213.
27 Id. at 214.
28 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 116 (citing Exec. Order No. 11905, 3 C.F.R.
§ 5(g), at 90, 101 (1977) as the order issued by President Ford). The order was also
[Vol. 24
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policy after the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was implicated
in plots to kill several high-ranking foreign leaders. 9 A Senate
investigation in 1975 focused on the role of the CIA in five
assassination plots.3° The Senate Committee found that outside of
the context of war, assassination is not an appropriate measure of
foreign policy, considering that ' assassination "'is incompatible
with American principle, international order and morality."'3
Further, assassination of a leader might prove to be a greater
problem due to resulting political instability or retaliation against
Americans. 32  After concluding that agency officials might have
acted without presidential approval, the Senate Committee
endorsed the Executive Order.33
The order does not provide any insight into the meaning of, or
reissued by President Carter who changed the prohibition on "political assassination" to
"assassinations" generally. See id. at 116 n.56 (citing Exec. Order No. 12036, 3 C.F.R.
§ 2-305, at 112, 129 (1978) as the order issued by President Carter). Presidents Bush
and Clinton allowed President Reagan's version of the order to stand. See Robert F.
Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States Violate
International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 599 n.240 (1995)..
29 See id. at 118; Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43
MERCER L. REV. 615, 632 (1992).
The CIA also responded to press allegations of its participation in assassination
attempts against foreign leaders. See Boyd M. Johnson III, Executive Order
12,333: The Permissibility of an American Assassination of a Foreign Leader, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 401, 407 (1992). In 1972 Director Richard Helms issued the first of
several agency directives that prohibited assassinations. See id. Subsequently, in 1973
his successor William Colby issued orders banning assassination following an internal
investigation. See id.
30 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 118. The House of Representatives also conducted
an investigation. See id. The Senate Committee examined assassination plots against
Patrice Lumumba, Premier of the Congo; Fidel Castro, President of Cuba; Rafael
Trujillo, President of the Dominican Republic; Ngo Dinh Diem, President of South
Vietnam; and Rene Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Chile. See id.; see
also Zengel, supra note 29, at 632-33 (detailing the Senate Committee's findings on the
CIA's role in these plots).
31 Zengel, supra note 29, at 633 (quoting S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1975)). The Senate Committee conducting the investigation was the Senate Select
Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
See id.
32 See id.
33 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 118-19.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the limitations of, assassination. As a result, some interpret the
Executive Order as prohibiting the United States from
participating in any killings of specific persons. 5 However, the
context of the initial Executive Order, issued by Ford, differs from
the current situation. The prohibition was issued in reaction to the
assassination of foreign government officials. 6 Since Osama bin
Laden is not a head of state, it is argued that the prohibition on
assassination does not apply to him." Further, these earlier plots
were not motivated by a legal justification, such as self-defense,
but by politics.38  Thus, "this background-and the types of
killings being criticized at the time-lends no support to. applying
the Executive Order to lawful killings undertaken in self defense
against terrorists who attack Americans or against their
sponsors."3 9 The U.S. Army supported this interpretation of the
Executive Order addressing assassinations in its recent
memorandum to President Clinton's Administration: "The
clandestine, low visibility, or overt use of force against legitimate
targets in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace,
where such individuals or groups pose an immediate
threat ... does not constitute assassination."40
Moreover, the imprecise use of the word "assassination" may
31 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 635; W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of
Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 4, 4.
Despite public discussion, the Reagan Administration declined to specifically exclude
punitive raids against terrorists from the ban on assassinations. See Johnson, supra note
29, at 420-21. However, based on its subsequent bombing raid of Libya, the
Administration did not believe this type of activity violated the ban. See id. at 421; see
also infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Libyan bombing).
35 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 636.
36 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 119.
17 See Trainor, supra note 7, at A19.
38 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 119.
39 Id. However, the ban should apply not only to the assassination of government
officials, but also "to the illegal killing of any person, even an ordinary citizen, so long
as the act has a political purpose." Id. at 119; see also Parks, supra note 34, at 4 (noting
that the characterization as assassination is not only based on the identity of the victim
but also the "covert nature" of the operation).
40 Richter, supra note 9, at Al. The memorandum was issued by the office of the
Army judge advocate general. See id.
[Vol. 24
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have been intentional. 4' Although the order provided a response to
the outrage at alleged assassination plots, it preserved flexibility in
interpretation.42 This flexibility is advantageous in that it "leav[es]
potential adversaries unsure as to exactly what action the United
States might be prepared to take if sufficiently provoked.
43
Further, by issuing the order, Ford eliminated the need for
legislation on assassination, which may have been more
stringent.44 The President retains the power to modify or revoke
the Executive Order.45 Congress also has the authority to revoke
or amend the Executive Order. 46  Their failure to exercise this
power, along with the fact that Congress has failed to pass three
legislative proposals prohibiting assassinations between 1976 and
1980,47 "might be interpreted as implicit authority for the President
41 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 635 (noting that the Executive Order "contains no
definition or further elaboration of what constitutes assassination").
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 637. Both former Vice President Quayle and former President Nixon
recommended the revocation of the Executive Order's ban on assassinations in order to
provide the President with this option should he deem it appropriate in extreme
situations. See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 599 n.242. However, it should be noted that
the President is not required to publicly publish a complete or partial revocation of
Executive Order 12,333. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 427. Since the order deals with
intelligence activities, any modifications may be classified information, thus preventing
publication of the revised order in the Federal Register. See id. (citing Bert
Brandenburg, Legality of Assassination, 27 VA. J. INT'L LAW 687 n.203 (1987)
(discussing § 1.3(a)(4) of Executive Order 12, 356)).
46 See Johnson, supra note 29, at 426.
47 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 634. In 1980 both houses of Congress introduced
bills banning assassination that duplicated the language in Carter's order. See Johnson,
supra note 29, at 411 (referring to H.R. 6588, 96th Cong. § 131 (1980) and S. 2284, 96 t,
Cong. § 131 (1980)); supra note 28 (discussing the language in Carter's executive
order). Critics have given several reasons for the lack of success of these bills: (1) the
Iran hostage crisis; (2) the situation in Afghanistan following the Soviet Union's
invasion; and (3) the lack of support from President Carter. See Johnson, supra note 29,
at 411 (citing Charles Hohr, Effort to Enact Intelligence Charter Is Abandoned by
Senate Advocates, N.Y. TIMES,' May 2, 1980, at Al). Additionally, commentators have
hypothesized reasons why Congress has never been successful in passing legislation
banning assassination: (1) since the public did not support the ban, members of
Congress had no motivation; (2) the Senate Committee allowed public interest to wane
by turning attention away from the CIA and other intelligence agencies; (3) the different
approaches the houses took in their investigations caused conflict-the House preferred
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
to retain such action as a policy option."4 Thus, instead of being
an absolute ban on assassination, the order reserves the right to
mandate such an action solely to the President.49
Further evidence that the ban on assassination was meant to
have a limited scope is that the United States has continued to
engage in "the use of military force to capture or kill individuals
whose peacetime actions constitute a direct threat to U.S. citizens
or U.S. national security."50 For example, the 1986 raid on Libya
in response to continued attacks by the Libyan government has
been characterized as an assassination attempt." In addition to
military targets, the United States bombed Colonel Qadhafi's
headquarters. 2 This action has been justified as a legitimate use of
military force in self-defense. 3 One commentator has suggested
that since this was a military action, rather than an intelligence
action, the Executive Order was inapplicable.m Instead, the proper
analysis is to examine whether the use of force by the United
States was justified.5 Because the United States recognizes the
an open investigation, while the Senate participated in covert communications with the
White House; and (4) the problems gathering information about the inner workings of
the intelligence committee hindered the investigations by both the House and the Senate.
See id.
48 Zengel, supra note 29, at 634.
41 See id. at 637. Reserving this power to the President has the benefit of insuring
accountability for such actions: "It discourages the establishment of 'plausible
deniability' within the government, which caused such difficulty for congressional
investigators seeking to trace ultimate responsibility for activities of the 1960s and early
1970s." Id.; see also Parks, supra note 34, at 8 (noting the purpose of the order was to
prevent "unilateral actions by individual agents or agencies").
50 Parks, supra note 34, at 7 (listing examples of the use of force by the United
States during peacetime).
"1 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 639. The 1986 U.S. attack on Libya was in
response to the Libyan government's alleged bombing of a Berlin discotheque, injuring
200 people, including 50 Americans. See id.
52 See id.
3 See id.; Sofaer, supra note 20, at 119-20. But see Boyle, supra note 19, at 296
(stating that "the attack on the compound was obviously intended to kill
Qadhafi[;] ... [thus,] [t]he attack clearly violated the Reagan Administration's own
standing Executive Order that prohibited U.S. participation in assassinations").
14 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 639.
" See id.
1999] LEGALITY OF ASSASSINATION OF TERRORIST LEADERS 677
use of self-defense against continuing threats, 6 the right of self-
defense would justify attacks against terrorist leaders who
represent a continuing threat to the safety of U.S. citizens and/or to
U.S. national security.57 This same analysis can be used to
evaluate the U.S. attacks on Iraq, which threatened Saddam
Hussein's life. In that case military action was justified as self-
defense based on the state of continued conflict between the
United States and Iraq.59 Thus, the attacks on Libya and Qadhafi,
and Iraq and Hussein were deemed legitimate despite the
Executive Order banning assassination.60
Osama bin Laden, unlike Qadhafi and Hussein, is not the
leader or representative of any country.6 Therefore, a military
attack in self-defense against him would realistically result in his
assassination.62 However, this action would be justified as well
because "[t]he purpose of Executive Order 12,333 and its
predecessors was to preclude unilateral actions by individual
agents or agencies[,] ... not to limit lawful self defense options
against legitimate threats to the national security of the United
56 See Parks, supra note 34, at 7.
57 See id. at 7 n.8. On April 17, 1986, some members of Congress, in light of
questions of the legality of the Libyan raid, proposed a bill allowing the President to use
force in response to foreign terrorist activities without prior approval of or consultation
with Congress. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 422.
58 See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 605. The June 26, 1993 bombing of Baghdad was
in response to a failed Iraqi assassination plot against former President Bush during his
April 1993 visit to Kuwait. See id. at 601-05.
59 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 638.
o The Iraqi attack was also legitimate under then-President Bush's expanded
interpretation of Executive Order 12,333. Bush read the order to allow military actions
that could result in the unintentional death of a foreign leader. See Teplitz, supra note
28, at 599 n.242. Further, Bush's stance was bolstered by Congress's grant of approval
for Hussein's death in its January 12, 1991 joint resolution allowing the President to use
military force against Iraqi combatants, which would include Hussein. See Chris A.
Anderson, Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher of Baghdad, 13 HAMLINE J.
PuB. L. & POL'Y 291, 311 (1992) (citing H.R.J. Res. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.).
61 See Trainor, supra note 7, at A19.
62 See Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to
Terrorism, 2 ToURO J. TRANSNAT'L L., 67, 70 (1991) (observing that "[p]rivate terrorists
cannot be attacked in the same way as a state because they have no territory or
government; their status as individuals changes the status of such an act against them by
a state from reprisal to, at least, execution").
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
States or individual U.S. citizens."" And, as FBI Director Louis
Freeh noted, "Mr. bin Laden... poses 'about as serious and
imminent threat as I can imagine."'64
Moreover, despite the Senate's uncertainty, the Clinton
Administration believes that regardless of the Executive Order,
deadly force is a viable option against bin Laden.65 In fact,
although the August 1998 bombing of one of bin Laden's training
camps in Afghanistan was ostensibly to destroy the camp and
materials, officials admitted that the administration would not
have been disappointed if the bombing had resulted in bin Laden's
death. 6  As the administration interprets the Executive Order, they
are not required "to direct their attacks solely at inanimate
'infrastructure' targets rather than at individuals." 67  If an
organization harms or threatens U.S. citizens, under the
administration's interpretation, they can authorize military or
undercover use of lethal force against the organization's leaders.68
Although this interpretation permits actions that indirectly result in
a person's death, the President may not issue a written order for
the death of a specific person.69 Since the order was issued by the
executive branch, Clinton's interpretation of the limits of this
executive law, which he left in force, should be given weight.70
63 Parks, supra note 34, at 8. But see Anderson, supra note 60, at 313 (observing
that without a state of war, the Executive Order 12,333 ban on the intentional killing of a
combatant is applicable).
6 Senators Ask Legality, supra note 1, at 13A.
65 See Richter, supra note 9, at Al; see also supra note 60 (discussing President
Bush's interpretation of the executive order).
66 See Richter, supra note 9, at Al.
67 Id.
61 See id.
69 See id.
70 Although lawmaking is a traditionally legislative function, the Supreme Court
determined that an executive order is constitutional if the President's actions have
statutory or constitutional support. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 413 (citing
Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)). Further, the Court held that the
failure of Congress to legislate in a certain area, such as foreign policy or national
security, does not implicate disapproval for the presidential action; rather, "'the
enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President's authority in a
particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion
may be considered to 'invite' measures on independent presidential responsibility."' Id.
[Vol. 24
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Ill. The Charter of the United Nations and International Law
A. United Nations Considerations
In addition to considering the legality of the assassination of
bin Laden under national law, the U.S. government must also
consider the international implications of such an undertaking. As
a member of the United Nations (U.N.), the United States is bound
to uphold the principles of the U.N. Charter (Charter).7 The
primary goal of the Charter is to prevent war.12  To meet this
objective, Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force: Member States
"shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations., 73  Actions of reprisal are prohibited under the
Charter; such actions are punitive in nature and invite retaliation 7 4
(quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654. 678 (1981) (quoting Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) and Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring))). Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan have looked to the
Constitution for the authority to issue the executive order banning assassinations. See
id. Four sections of the Constitution could be cited for the power to issue executive
orders: (1) Article II, Section I, granting executive power to the President; (2) Article II,
Section 2, Clause 1, naming the President as Commander-in-Chief; (3) Article II,
Section 3, requiring faithful execution by the President; and (4) making the President
"exclusively responsible for the conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs." Id. at 415
(referring to.U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. II, § 2, cl. 1; art. II, § 3). Additionally,
the Presidents have found statutory authority for executive orders banning assassinations
in the National Security Act of 1947. See id. (citing National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 401-432 (1992) [hereinafter NSA]). This statute appoints the
President as the head of the National Security Council (NSC). See id. at 415-16 (citing
NSA § 402(a)). Since this legislation allows the President to direct the NSC, the statute
is closely related to the President's authority, thereby showing the legislative intent
required by Dames & Moore to grant the President broad discretion. See id. at 416.
71 See Parks, supra note 34, at 8 (noting "a decision by the President to employ
clandestine, low visibility or overt military force would not constitute assassination if
U.S. military forces were employed against.., a terrorist... whose actions pose a
threat to the security of the United States" as long as the action was also consistent with
the Charter of the United Nations).
72 See James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and
Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 310
(1987).
73 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
71 See John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States
Raid on Iraq's Intelligence Headquarters, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 241,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
However, the Charter recognizes the right of self-defense as an
exception to this ban.75
The scope of the self-defense exception is unclear. One
interpretation is that Article 2(4) permits actions of self-defense in
response to "a use of force that materially threatens a State's
'territorial integrity or political independence."'76  The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) also adopted .a 'narrow
interpretation of self-defense.17  A stringent interpretation,
however, "ignores the Charter's preservation of the 'inherent'
scope of the right" of self-defense.78 No distinction was made
between the concept of self-defense and defense in general by the
drafters of the Charter or by customary law. 79  Furthermore,
nations have historically protected their citizens and national
interest from attacks despite the absence of any threat to the
nation's existence." As a result, self-defense could be interpreted
to include "measures necessary to protect the state and its people
from outside armed attack in all its conventional and
nonconventional forms."'
'
Article 51 of the Charter is the provision that explicitly
recognizes the right of self-defense: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
265-66, 267 (1994).
71 See Rowles, supra note 72, at 310 (referring to U.N. CHARTER art. 51). The
other exception is the use of force upon approval of the U.N. Security Council. See
Teplitz, supra note 28, at 574 (citing U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42-43, 48).
76 Sofaer, supra note 20, at 96.
77 See id. at 91 n.5. (citing Military' and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27, 1986) (holding that an
attack against Nicaragua was an illegitimate exercise of self-defense because
Nicaragua's act of supplying weaponry to El Salvadorian rebels did not constitute an
armed attack)).
78 Id. at 96.
71 See Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PRoC. 297, 307 (1987).
80 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 96.
si Coil, supra note 79, at 307; cf Murphy, supra note 62, at 71 (noting one
problem associated with allowing acts of self-defense in response to terrorism is that
since there is no uniformly accepted definition of terrorism, a state may use force in
inappropriate situations, which would undermine the Charter's primary goal of ending
war).
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self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations."82  Critics of the use of the self-defense
justification advocate interpreting this provision based on
international customary law, embodied in the 1837 statement of
U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, known as the "Caroline
Doctrine."83 Webster suggested that self-defense applies only in
extraordinary circumstances where the "necessity of self-defense
[is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."" Critics argue that responses to
terrorist acts do not meet this standard.85 One commentator has
suggested that Article 51 prohibits acts of retaliation or reprisal
against terrorists since they occur after the attack. 6 Additionally,
any anticipatory actions are prohibited by this standard.8 7 Further,
although there is no requirement as to the scale of an attack,88 one
view of Article 51 is that it does require an attack against another
82 U.N. CHARTER art. 51. One commentator has suggested that the purpose of the
prerequisite in Article 51 of an armed attack "limits the use of force to situations
involving the type of serious attack on a state that can be verified by independent
observers." Rowles, supra note 72, at 310.
83 Coil, supra note 79, at 301. The Caroline Incident has roots in the Canadian
rebellions against British rule that occurred in 1837. See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 574.
The United States remained neutral, but some U.S. citizens along the border provided
assistance to the Canadian cause. See id. at 574-75. On December 29, 1837, supplies
were sent from Buffalo, New York to Navy Island on the privately owned U.S.
steamboat Caroline. See id. at 575. The British commander, Colonel Adam McNabb,
ordered the destruction of the Caroline to insure that no other provisions reached the
Canadians. See id. at 576. Henry Fox, British Ambassador to the United States,
justified the action as a measure of self-defense. See id. at 577. U.S. Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster disagreed with the British conclusion that the attack on the Caroline was
in self-defense. See id. He responded with his interpretation of a legitimate exercise of
self-defense, which came to be known as the "Caroline Doctrine." See id.
84 Id.
85 See Rowles, supra note 72, at 314.
86 See Boyle, supra note 19, at 294; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text
(discussing the illegality of reprisal generally under the U.N. Charter). Boyle notes that
traditionally the U.S. government accepted this restrictive interpretation of self-defense
in order to reduce the use of force by other nations. See Boyle, supra note 19, at 294.
He further suggests that President Reagan abandoned this interpretation in his use of
self-defense to justify the April 14, 1986 bombing of Libya. See id. at 293; see also
supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the attack on Libya).
87 See Anderson, supra note 60, at 299.
81 See id. at 298.
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state.89 This would also preclude an attack against non-state
sponsored terrorist groups. The ICJ endorsed this view that
terrorist acts do not rise to the level of "armed attacks," thus
precluding the use of self-defense before the court as a justification
for any forceful response to such acts.9° However, this restrictive
interpretation of "armed attack" protects terrorists "who attack
sporadically on foreign territory, even though they can be counted
on to attack specific States repeatedly."91
In light of the fact that the world and military capabilities have
changed in the last 150 years, the language of Article 51 should be
interpreted more expansively.92 Application of the Caroline
Doctrine to Article 51 fails to account for the right of a state to
protect itself before suffering an attack.93 Thus, in the nuclear age,
a state may be forced to suffer total annihilation before being
allowed to respond.94  Therefore, "[a] sound construction of
[A]rticle 51 would allow any State, once a terrorist 'attack occurs'
or is about to occur, to use force against those responsible for the
attack in order to prevent the attack or to deter further attacks
unless reasonable ground exists to believe that no further attack
will be undertaken." 95 Such action would be consistent with the
Charter's ultimate aim of deterrence against armed conflict.96
Further, if the U.N. refuses to adapt its view of self-defense,
nations may individually choose to determine when an attack in
89 See Quigley, supra note 74, at 250. This view also queries whether in order to
justify the use of self-defense, the initial attack must also be against the state, rather than
against nationals of a state. See id. at 255-56. However, others believe that an attack on
nationals is in fact an attack on the state itself, thereby justifying use of force in self-
defense. See id. at 256.
90 W. Michael Reisman, Remarks, Covert Action, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 419, 421
(1995) (citing to Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June
27)).
9' Sofaer, supra note 20, at 95-96.
92 See Coil, supra note 79, at 302.
93 See Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 231, 239 (1992) [hereinafter The
Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination].
14 See id.
95 Sofaer, supra note 20, at 95.
96 See id. But see Quigley, supra note 74, at 265 (noting that deterrence suggests
reprisal, which is prohibited under the Charter, rather than self-defense).
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self-defense is appropriate, thereby lessening the U.N.'s control
over the use of force.97
The United States interprets Article 51 to allow three forms of
self-defense: "(1) self-defense against an actual use of force or
hostile act; (2) preemptive self-defense against an imminent use of
force; and (3) self-defense against a continuing threat."98 Based on
this view, U.S. Presidents have authorized the use of assassination
in self-defense when another country fails to uphold its
international duty to prevent violent attacks from originating in its
territory and when a country assists in international criminal
activities, such as terrorism.9 9  The United States used this
interpretation to justify its attack on Qadhafi's headquarters' °° and
its attack on Iraq.' °' Since Afghanistan's Taliban government does
not want to cooperate with the U.S. efforts to apprehend bin
Laden, 02 an assassination attempt would be justifiable under this
interpretation. However, the other members of the U.N. do not
seem to adopt this expansive view of the right of self-defense as
evidenced by a Security Council draft resolution that condemned
the U.S. actions against Libya °3 and a subsequent condemnation
97 See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 614.
98 Johnson, supra note 29, at 420.
99 See id.
100 See id.; supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
"I See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 600-01; supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
102 See Suspected Terrorist in Afghanistan, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 11, 1999, at 7,
available in 1999 WL 3978434. The Taliban, Afghanistan's military government, has
refused to allow bin Laden's extradition. See id. The Taliban justifies this inaction by
claiming there is no evidence linking bin Laden to the embassy bombings and that he is
a guest in their country. See Kathy Gannon, Taliban Promises to Help bin Laden,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 21783382. The Taliban does,
however, have concerns about bin Laden's presence in their country because of
international reaction, which could result in the loss of "recognition or foreign aid."
Suspected Terrorist in Afghanistan, supra, at 7.
103 See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 586 (citing U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2682d mtg. at
43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986)). The draft resolution, condemning the U.S. attack as a
violation of the Charter and customary international law, was proposed on April 21,
1986 by the Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab
Emirates. See id. The resolution failed because of vetoes by the United States, Great
Britain, and France. See id.
The U.S. invasion of Panama was similarly disapproved. On December 23,
1989, a draft resolution was proposed by Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal,
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by the General Assembly.' °'  However, the U.N. has been
inconsistent in its evaluation of U.S. actions. In reaction to the
bombing of Iraq, the Security Council took no action and merely
acknowledged the U.S. explanation.0 5 Nevertheless, despite the
unpopularity of its interpretation of self-defense under Article 51,
the United States is still able to act as it deems appropriate without
U.N. censure since the United States is a permanent member of the
Security Council and any resolution requires its approval.'
0 6
Although the United States is still subject to measures by the
General Assembly, cooperation is on a voluntary basis.° 7
The inapplicability of the preventive measures of the Charter
to a response to a terrorist attack also supports the conclusion that
force against a terrorist leader is acceptable. 8 Article 33 requires
parties to a dispute that threatens international peace to exhaust all
peaceful means to reach an agreement.1°9 These means "include
negotiation, enquiry [sic], mediation, conciliation, arbitration or
judicial settlement."" 0 Since bin Laden is not the representative of
Senegal, and Yugoslavia. See id. at 591 (citing U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2902d mtg. at
18-20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2902 (1989)). Once again, the resolution was rejected by the
United States, Great Britain, and France. See id.
104 See id. at 586. The General Assembly issued the condemnation, which also
required compensation for losses suffered, at the behest of Libya. See id.
10' See id. at 607. Furthermore, the U.N. participated with the United States in an
effort to capture Mohammed Farah Aideed in Somalia, which could have resulted in his
death. See Reisman, supra note 90, at 422-23.
106 See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 593. The United States is unlikely to lend its
support for a resolution condemning its own actions. The requirement of the approval
of all of the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) is known as the "Great Power Veto." See id.
107 See id. at 594. The General Assembly procedure was created in 1950 in
response to situations, such as the United States' actions in Libya and Panama, in which
the veto powers of the permanent members prevented the Security Council from issuing
resolutions. See id. at 593 (referring to the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, G.A. Res.
377, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 302d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950)).
108 The use of force in self-defense may still be a viable option in cases of state-
sponsored terrorism. See John F. Murphy, Remarks, Military Responses to Terrorism,
81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 319 (1987).
109 See Boyle, supra note 19, at 289 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 33).
110 Id.
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any state,' he is not a party to the United Nations. Therefore, he
is not bound by these requirements, nor would these solutions
prove effective. Furthermore, negotiation with bin Laden would
give recognition and legitimacy to his organization and
activities."' Also, "since terrorist groups are not structured like
states, they are incapable of negotiating effectively or enforcing
their agreements.""' 3 Submission of the dispute to an international
arbitration tribunal would involve similar problems.
B. Customary International Law Considerations
The permissibility of an assassination of a terrorist leader
under customary international law"' generally is as debatable as its
legality under the Charter of the United Nations. Nations have the
right of self-defense as articulated by Webster in the Caroline
Doctrine, providing there is an imminent threat, necessary
response, proportionate reaction, and exhaustion of all peaceful
means."' However, as in the U.N. Charter, the boundaries of self-
defense are not clearly defined.
It is generally accepted that nations may respond to terrorist
acts with force within their own territories." 6 However, this power
is subject to some limitations. A terrorist may not be executed on
the spot if he is not an immediate threat, and a terrorist may not be
executed for past acts without due process of law.' Additionally,
torture is never allowed."' States are also allowed to use force
"' See Senators Ask Legality, supra note 1, at 13A.
112 See Murphy, supra note 62, at 72.
113 Id.
114 Customary international law is comprised of preemptory norms, usually dealing
with issues of human rights, that are accepted and followed by the international
community. See Anderson, supra note 60, at 305. A preemptory norm prevails unless a
contrary principle is internationally accepted. See id. Preemptory norms, unlike the
U.N. Charter, do not govern relations among states but obligations of states to the
international community as a whole. See id.
15 See Teplitz, supra note 28, at 578, 608; see also supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text (discussing the Caroline Doctrine and its application to the
interpretation of self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51).
116 See Rowles, supra note 72, at 312.
117 See id.
18 See id.
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against terrorists within the territory of other states with
permission from those states." 9 Problems arise in situations in
which the other state has not granted consent.
Attacking a terrorist within another state without obtaining that
state's permission is a violation of that nation's sovereignty. 2°
However, as one commentator noted, "territorial integrity is not
entitled to absolute deference in international law."''21 Moreover,
although such an act may be technically illegal, kidnapping a
terrorist in violation of another nation's territorial rights may be
legal or tolerable because it is morally justified. 22  Such an act
would be a bloodless way to bring a terrorist to justice.' 23 Further,
this may be the only option for obtaining justice against the
terrorist.2 4 The states in which terrorists are commonly located are
usually unwilling or unable to extradite them. Countries with
whom the United States has an extradition treaty are often able to
avoid carrying out their obligations because of the so-called
"political exception. '  This exception allows a nation to refuse
extradition if the nation concludes that the perpetrator's actions
were carried out for political purposes or that the perpetrator may
be subject to political persecution in the requesting state.127 This1" 28
exception has broad application' since each individual state
119 See id.
120 See Coil, supra note 79, at 306; see also Rowles, supra note 72, at 313-14
(noting that such an act also violates "the territorial state's right to freedom from the
threat or use of force against its territorial integrity or political independence"). This
prohibition parallels the impermissibility of the transnational assassination of a leader
when two nations are engaged in a state of war. See The Permissibility of State-
Sponsored Assassination, supra note 93, at 236. This ban does not preempt the right to
wage war in the aggressor's territory and to take preemptive measures to prevent future
acts of aggression. See Anderson, supra note 60, at 306.
121 Sofaer, supra note 20, at 106.
122 See Coll, supra note 79, at 306.
123 See id.
124 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 106-07.
125 See id. at 106.
126 Murphy, supra note 62, at 76.
127 See id. For example, this political exception allows members of the Irish
Republican Army to have freedom in the United States, despite their actions against the
British government. See Coil, supra note 79, at 303.
128 See Murphy, supra note 62, at 77.
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determines what constitutes a political offense.'29  Further, a
request for extradition may provide a warning to the terrorist that
his location is known,3 ° which would most likely result in his
flight. Thus, as one commentator concluded, permitting invasion
of other nations' territories in order to eliminate a terrorist leader is
in fact consistent with the aims of international law: "A world in
which [terrorists] refrain from threatening innocent human beings
with destruction... is as important an objective of international
law and as conducive to genuine international legal order as one in
which states scrupulously respect each other's formal
sovereignty." 3'
The question remains whether such exceptions to violations of
sovereign rights would allow an assassination. Under customary
international law, assassination is understood as "the selected
killing of an individual enemy by treacherous means.' 32 In this
context treachery is "a breach of a duty of good faith toward the
victim."'33  However, the scope of this duty is unclear.3 4  One
commentator has suggested that since international law requires
states to observe the same protections of no execution, no torture,
and due process when dealing with terrorists outside their
borders, 33 the covert assassination of terrorists by hit squads
violates international human rights law. 3" Others note that
although assassination is generally illegal, in times of war, this
action is permissible since the victim is a combatant.'37 The
historical justification for preventing assassinations was based on
"the premise that making war was a proper activity of sovereigns
129 See id. at 76.
130 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 106.
131 Coil, supra note 79, at 306.
132 Zengel, supra note 29, at 622.
133 Id.
134 See id.
135 See Rowles, supra note 72, at 312.
136 See id. at 313.
137 See Parks, supra note 34, at 4-5; Sofaer, supra note 20, at 119; The
Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination, supra note 93, at 237. The term
"combatants" embodies those who are actually involved in combat as well as those who
provide support. See Anderson, supra note 60, at 302.
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for which they ought not be required to sacrifice their personal
safety."'38 Since war is no longer perceived as a noble pursuit,139
this reason for a ban on assassination is no longer valid. Thus,
assassination would be permissible despite the absence of a formal
war, as in the situation between the United States and bin Laden.
Further, this action may be desirable if assassination of a leader
would result in fewer deaths and less damage.' 4
The customary international law concept of self-defense also
diverges from the U.N. Charter in its allowance of preemptive
actions. The recognition of this right dates to 1625 when Hugo
Grotius noted that self-defense is available both in response to and
in anticipation of military attacks. Assassination is arguably an
appropriate use of self-defense in light of the destructiveness of
modern weaponry. 42  However, the use of assassination as a
measure of self-defense should be subject to some limitations.
First, states must ensure that only persons who pose a threat are
subject to assassination. 4 1 Second, the use of assassination must
comply with the Caroline Doctrine requirements of proportionality
and necessity.'" Third, the state's evidence must indicate beyond
a reasonable doubt that a destructive attack against the state is
planned or being planned.14' Finally, the state must determine that
the assassination would prevent the attack and would result in less
harm to civilians. 4 1 If these guidelines are followed, assassination
can be used as a law enforcement mechanism to prevent
devastating attacks. 14
138 Zengel, supra note 29, at 621.
'39 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
140 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 638-39 (discussing the legality of an assassination
of Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War).
141 See The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination, supra note 93, at 231
(citing 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 169-85 (Francis W. Kelsey,
trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1646)).
142 See id. at 240.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id. Beres also provides a summary account of a permissible assassination
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IV. Alternatives to Assassination
Assassination is not the only possible solution to the problem
with bin Laden. The United States can opt to employ other
forceful or non-forceful methods. However, one commentator
observed that none of these options provides an amenable solution:
"[F]orceful options may lead to escalation and non-forceful
options... are equally ineffective. .. '[because] it is simply
difficult, if not impossible, for a state to make a law with terrorists
who are private individuals."
1 48
The United States, in its August 1998 bombing of bin Laden'straiing ampsin . 149
training camps in Afghanistan,. employed the short-term
deterrence strategy of "destruction of facilities and infrastructure
used in the preparation of terrorist acts."' 5° This strategy is legally
justifiable under the U.N. Charter as a measure of self-defense. 5'
However, such measures provide protection only for the
immediate future. Illustratively, despite the U.S. action, bin Laden
still remains a threat.
Since bin Laden's indictment for the U.S. embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States has employed a record
number of FBI agents to track him.," This action is acceptable
under international law since sovereign immunity protection
against kidnapping would not apply to a stateless leader such as
under customary international law carried out by an Israeli group against Sheik Abbas
Musawi, the leader of the pro-Iranian Party of God in Lebanon. See id. at 242.
However, the assassins did violate the discrimination requirement, allowing states to
only kill those persons who pose a threat. See id. Not only was the target Musawi killed
but also his family and bodyguards. See id. at 243-44.
148 Murphy, supra note 62, at 79.
149 See Richter, supra note 9, at Al.
151 Coll, supra note 79, at 299-300.
... See id. at 300 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 51). Despite its legality, this strategy
does have disadvantages. Since terrorist activities are planned surreptitiously, "one
cannot prove with absolute certainty that the particular group or facility that suffered the
blow was going to be used against that state." Id. Although states will be careful in
selecting targets because of potential international censure for attacking innocent people,
this possibility remains. See id. Further, a preemptive strike may be a violation of the
sovereignty of the nation that, although it does not support the terrorist activity, is the
location of the terrorist group activities.
152 See Neumeister, supra note 4, at IA.
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bin Laden.'53 However, the agents face several potential problems.
First, bin Laden's vast resources will enable him to remain
hidden.5 4  Moreover, there seems to be a lowered tolerance for
covert activities across state borders; thus, operatives may be
subject to local law despite their authorization from the U.S.
government.'55
Additionally, the United States has employed the help of
private citizens. The government has offered a $5 million reward
for bin Laden's capture so that he can be brought to the United
States to face prosecution for the embassy bombings.' 56 However,
this measure poses complications. To remove culpability from the
U.S. government, U.S. officials would have to emphasize that
diplomatic protection would not be extended to persons
committing kidnappings overseas. 1"' The U.S. government would
also have to exempt certain terrorists because of their presence in
an allied country or other country with whom the United States has
"a relationship of a sensitive nature.""'' Otherwise, relations
between the United States and these countries would become
153 See Louis Rene Beres, Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The Imperative to
Punish, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 335, 352 (1992-93) [hereinafter Iraqi Crimes and
International Law].
154 See Neumeister, supra note 4, at IA. In fact, bin Laden has reportedly left
Afghanistan. See Terror Suspect's Exit Welcomed, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 19, 1999, at
A09, available in 1999 WL 3751501. It is believed bin, Laden may be in Chechnya,
Somalia, or Iraq. See id. Despite claims that bin Laden felt snubbed by the Taliban
leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and the Taliban welcomed his departure, some feel that
he may still be in Afghanistan. See Susan Cornwell, Bin Laden Reported to Have Left
Afghanistan; U.S. Prodded Taliban to Hand Over Terrorist,, STAR-LEDGER (Newark),
Feb. 15, 1999, at 049, available in 1999 WL 295568. Yousef Bodansky, staff director
of the House Task Force on Terrorism, explains bin Laden's disappearance as an attempt
to protect the Taliban from U.S. retaliation for any of his terrorist acts. See Niles
Lathem & Uri Dan, bin Laden Plotting New Attacks, N.Y. POST, Feb. 21, 1999, at 2,
available in 1999 WL 12817770.
... See Reisman, supra note 90, at 422 (noting that this reaction resulted from
international dissatisfaction with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), authorizing forcible extraditions).
156 See Neumeister, supra note 4, at IA; see also Johnson, supra note 29, at 419
(noting that military law prohibits rewards on an enemy's head or for his return "dead or
alive").
157 See Coll, supra note 79, at 306.
158 Id. at 306-07.
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hostile. Thus, rewards would only be offered for the return of
terrorists in countries with whom the United States has poor
relations.'" However, this would result in the sanctioning and
encouragement of vigilantism by the U.S. government. Setting
this foreign policy precedent for other nations could result in
similar acts being perpetrated against U.S. citizens or within U.S.
borders.
If the efforts of the FBI agents and others fail to bring bin
Laden to the United States for trial, a trial in his absence could still
be held. However, such an action might violate due process under
both national and international law.' 60 The U.N., in the Revised
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, preserved the
right of an accused to a "fair trial," which includes the right to be
present throughout all of the proceedings. 16  The European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms also preserves the right to be present or to choose legal
counsel to serve as one's representative.'62 Thus, a trial in absentia
without these protections might undermine guarantees of due
process under the law.
Instead of focusing on bin Laden, the United States could
expend its resources on strengthening the defenses of its facilities
in other nations. However, the result could be that the terrorists
would attack other targets. For example, if the United States
strengthened protections of embassies in volatile areas, terrorists
might attack embassies in other areas 64 Even if all embassies
could be sufficiently guarded, terrorists would turn their attention
to other U.S. government facilities. 65  As one commentator
159 See id. at 307.
1o See Iraqi Crimes and International Law, supra note 153, at 352.
161 See id. at 353 (citing Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
Annex to the Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 20,
1953, U.N. G.A.O.R., 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954)).
162 See id. (citing European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No.5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953)).
163 See Trainor, supra note 7, at A19.
'64 See id.
165 See id.
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observed, "The target does not matter, it is the shock value of
destroying an American facility and killing. Americans that counts
with terrorists.' 66
Use of intelligence agents to infiltrate bin Laden's group seems
impossible. Unlike traditional criminal groups, terrorist
organizations are comprised of religious or political extremists.
167
Penetration of such groups requires skills that are beyond those of
even the most experienced agents. 16  Further, "committed
terrorists are immune to bribes, blackmail, and coercion."' 69 U.S.
officials claim that intelligence methods have resulted in
disrupting some of bin Laden's operations. 70 However, although
these measures, including "arrests [of his
associates].... intercepted communications, satellite surveillance
and financial detective work" have limited bin Laden's personnel,
financial, and weapons resources, they do not have long-term
effects.'' In fact, CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate:
"[W]e are concerned that one or more of bin Laden's attacks could
occur at any time."''
Another possible solution is to place the onus on the
governments of other countries to protect the United States against
bin Laden. The responsibility for protecting U.S. property and
officials in other countries falls on the host countries. " However,
despite the current plague of terrorist acts, which should prompt
heightened security, host countries have been unable to fulfill this
obligation, as evidenced by the African embassy bombings. 7 4 The
166 Id.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 Id.
170 See Vernon Loeb, Has the U.S. Blunted bin Laden? Yes and No, Terrorist
Fighters Say, Describing an Invisible War, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1999, at A04,
available in 1999 WL 2200050.
171 Id.; see also Tim Weiner, bin Laden Now Hero for Islam, Hous. CHRON., Feb.
21, 1999, at A3 1, available in 1999 WL 3975428 (quoting one counter-terrorism official
as saying, "I don't think [bin Laden is] isolated, incommunicado or out of money").
172 Loeb, supra note 170, at A04.
173 See Trainor, supra note 7, at A19.
174 See id.
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United States could also seek aid from the Afghani Taliban
government. It is unlikely that this will be productive either. The
U.S. government has withheld recognition of the Taliban as the
official government of Afghanistan. 7s Expectantly, these
countries do not have an extradition treaty with the United States.
Without such a treaty, Afghanistan has no duty to extradite bin
Laden. 7 6 Further, Afghanistan itself in a November 1998 Taliban
Supreme Court hearing, exonerated bin Laden of all terrorist
charges.77  Since the Taliban has provided protection for bin
Laden, 7 1 this proceeding is not conclusive; "there will inevitably
be a suspicion of bias when a national court tries an international
criminal.' 79
Nonforceful options are also fundamentally flawed in
application to the terrorist situation. As discussed, negotiation
with terrorists is not 'an option.8 Since bin Laden does not
represent a country,'8' economic sanctions are also inapplicable. 2
Further, since there is no existing international criminal court183
and the ICJ only resolves problems between member countries, the
115 See George Gedda, Bin Laden Has Departed Afghanistan, Official Says, TIMES
UNION, (Albany), Feb. 18, 1999, at A2, available in 1999 WL 8970158.
176 See Murphy, supra note 62, at 72-73; see also supra note 102 and
accompanying text (discussing Afghanistan's refusal to extradite bin Laden).
17 See Afghans Silence but Won't Expel bin Laden, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
Feb. 13, 1999, at 32A, available in 1999 WL 2470754.
178 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Taliban's refusal to
extradite bin Laden and the Taliban's view that he is a guest).
179 Murphy, supra note 62, at 78. Murphy added that "[t]he lack of... agreement
on a definition of terrorism makes it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain consistent, and
therefore, deterrent judgments in extradition proceedings." Id. at 78-79. He suggested
that these problems would be eliminated by the creation of an international court system.
See id. at 99. He noted that there would be considerable difficulty in establishing such a
system because not only would nations have to cede some of their sovereign rights, but
also they would have to agree on the applicable law. See id. at 100, 103. However,
since no such system is in place, this is not a viable option for the United States in
dealing with bin Laden.
180 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
181 See Trainor, supra note 7, at A19.
182 See Murphy, supra note 62, at 72.
183 See id. at 68 (noting that "[a]n international criminal court could provide
consistent identification and punishment of international terrorism"); supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
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United States cannot bring international legal action against bin
Laden.
V. Conclusion
It is unlikely that the threat of terrorism will abate because
"[w]hile terrorism is viewed as a moral evil in the Western world,
others see it as a legitimate strategic tool-a proper means to a
desired end."'184 The surge of terrorism as a method of political
warfare requires reanalysis of acceptable defense measures.
Individuals or groups of terrorists provide an even greater
dilemma. Unlike state-sponsored terrorists, traditional retaliatory
measures such as sanctions, international censure, and invasion are
not applicable. However, these terrorists do not deserve special
treatment. Thus, a military attack against a terrorist threat should
not be viewed any differently from an attack against conventional
forces in response to a threat.185 Since bin Laden is an individual,
such an attack is likely to result in his assassination.
Assassination of terrorist leaders is arguably permissible under
current national law.8 6 The history and application of Executive
Order 12,333 indicates its ban was limited to assassinations of
heads of state or other assassinations carried out without express
authorization of the President.187  Despite this history, the
prohibition on assassinations has been interpreted overbroadly;
American citizens seem to disapprove of governmental killings,
especially of specifically targeted people, and, as a result, officials
want to avoid controversy."' The limitation on the availability of
this strategy is damaging to national security planning.8 9
The legality of assassination under international law is less
evident.' 9° The purpose of the U.N. Charter is to end war;
184 Guy Roberts, Remarks, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 287, 318 (1987).
185 See Parks, supra note 34, at 7.
186 See supra notes 34-70 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
188 See Anderson, supra note 60, at 294-95.
"9 See id. at 295.
190 See supra notes 71-147 and accompanying text.
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however, a right of self-defense is still recognized. 9' The limits of
this right are unclear, although acts of reprisal and preemption are
explicitly unlawful. 9 2  Arguably, the provisions of the U.N.
Charter do not govern situations involving non-state sponsored
terrorism. Non-military measures are inappropriate since
economic sanctions cannot be carried out against individuals and
negotiations with terrorists are not desirable.' Further, the U.N.
regulates behavior between states. Terrorists such as bin Laden
are not states; thus, they may not be members of the U.N. even if
they wish to be. This means they are not subject to the provisions
of the U.N. Charter. Thus, it seems unfair and beyond the aims of
the Charter to require states to limit the scope of their responses to
terrorist activities to permissible acts as defined under the Charter.
Although assassination is not generally accepted under
customary international law, it may be permissible as an act of
self-defense, carried out pursuant to the Caroline Doctrine.' 94
However, the limitations and proper applications of this action are
unclear.
To remedy this confusion in formal and customary
international law, one commentator has suggested that officials
encourage the development of an international nonmilitary system
to work for the elimination of terrorism.'95 However, until such
mechanisms are . effectively operational, in "the existing
decentralized international :system of sovereign nation-states
lack[ing] effective institutions for impartially adjudicating claims
and punishing unjust or unlawful conduct[,] ... states have no
choice, but to act as 'judges and avengers." 196
It is argued that despite a clear prohibition of assassination by
Executive Order 12,333, assassination should not, in the future, be
considered a viable option for the United States. 197 Not only does
191 See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 74, 86-87 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 114-47 and accompanying text.
195 See Coil, supra note 79, at 304.
196 Id. at 300.
197 See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 116 (noting that "[p]rohibiting 'assassination' is
legally, militarily, and morally sound").
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such an act violate the United States' moral standing, but also puts
American leaders at risk of similar acts.' 98  The United States
should not resort to terrorist acts itself.199 Moreover, a failed
assassination attempt could be embarrassing for the United States
on the international stage. 00 Such action by the United States
could also lead to retaliation.'O° However, "[a] limitation on
assassination undoubtedly disadvantages the United States in a
contest with States or groups that routinely resort to murder.,
20 2
Further, if terrorist acts continue, the attacks will become even
deadlier since "[t]he bombs are getting smaller, more powerful,
and more numerous., 20 3  Not only is a terrorist action a corporal
threat, but it is also a psychological threat to the United States and
its international stature.' °4 As one commentator concluded,
[T]oday's law attempts first to prevent the outbreak of war and
then, should these efforts fail, attempts to limit the resulting
damage and bring the fighting to as rapid an end as possible. In
this context, it makes little sense to preserve a special and
unique provision of law that protects the lives of single
individuals, regardless of their prominence, at the expense of
the lives and well-being of hundreds or thousands of others.
Since war cannot be declared on the person of Osama bin
Laden or his group, his elimination is the only way to be certainth a t i n n c e n p e p l e ar e o t a r m d b h i " " 2 0 6
that innocent people are not harmed by his actions. Further, if
198 See id. at 117.
199 See Johnson, supra note 29, at 434. Johnson characterizes assassination as "a
brutal, cowardly, and inhuman act." Id.
200 See Zengel, supra note 29, at 638.
201 Such a reaction may be expected considering the current threat of retaliation by
a Pakistani Muslim group merely for bin Laden's arrest. See Militant Group Threatens
to Retaliate if U.S. Arrests bin Laden, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Nov. 5, 1998.
202 Sofaer, supra note 20, at 117.
203 Id. at 122.
204 See Trainor, supra note 7, at A19.
205 Zengel, supra note 29, at 643-44; see also Anderson, supra note 60, at 295
(distinguishing between assassination, "the intentional and unprivileged killing of a
public figure for political, ideological or religious purposes," and lawful homicide, "the
taking of the life of one wrongdoer in self-defense to spare the lives of thousands").
206 See Iraqi Crimes and International Law, supra note 153, at 356 (noting that in
certain circumstances human rights are more important than a ban on transnational
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the United States is willing to take such drastic action against bin
Laden, other groups will be wary of similar retaliation should they
choose to attack Americans. Thus, assassination must be an
accepted solution for the terrorist plague.
JAMI MELISSA JACKSON
assassination). But see Johnson, supra note 29, at 434 (commenting that "[n]oble ends
cannot justify the brutality of assassination").

